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Abstract: Recently, Nigeria has experienced various acts of domestic terrorism and kidnapping
that may be rooted in many forms of motivations and agitations. These aggressions have resulted
in homegrown bloodshed, émigré aggression, or even organized international network assaults
against the population. The scourge of these terrorist activities has continued to weaken the
Nigerian character or moral fiber. While the government is trying to combat these offenses caused
by extremist activities, there are still remedies that have not been implemented prudently or
applied properly. In this article, we propose various forms of the repertoire of actions which the
government can use to effectively fight and combat terrorism in a democratic Nigeria.
Introduction
While, historically, West African countries have not cuddled with the kind of terrorism that
surround Nigeria today (Onwudiwe 2001) in the face of the new contours of terrorism confronting
the Nigerian nation and the ensuing insecurities in the country, it may be faultily deduced that
Nigeria has failed to safeguard its internal security and therefore poses a danger for the rest of the
African continent. This article takes a different view and rejects any attempt to tag Nigeria as a
failed state, rather, it underscores the need to put forward a multi-dimensional remedies that
constitute the parameters for archiving and maintaining the security of the country. Nigeria’s
insecurity is a reality with the glaring evidence that stems from the Boko Haram’s infirmity. Acts
of kidnapping, aside from terrorism and other criminalities, are also raging in Nigeria. These acts
of terrorism and other ills have escalated since after the bombings of the World Trade Center in
the United States on September 11, 2011 and the election of President Good Luck Jonathan in
April 2011. Based on these trends, Nigeria’s insecurity dilemma demands different levels of
explanations. Nigeria is no longer immune from domestic and émigré terrorists. Nigeria is
vulnerable like other countries that Al-Qaida terror network targets. The insecurities in the country
have grown even beyond the corridors of terrorism, defined as acts of violence rooted in political,
social, religious, and cultural objectives. Today, Nigeria, especially, northern Nigerians dwell in
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fear of kidnappings—and women and children—suffer the consequences the most. The mission
of this article is to articulate strategic security measures that Nigeria needs to slow the tidal wave
of terrorism and kidnapping without engaging in explaining and defining terrorism as such
attempts have been properly documented (Onwudiwe 2001, White 2009).
Below, workable practical solutions are provided that have been used in other places to
fight terrorism. For instance, in the United States, most domestic terrorists have been prosecuted
out of existence and have also been denied funding needed to carry out terrorist objectives (Smith
1994). In Britain, they have, historically, used CCTV and other technological innovations to
control Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) mayhem and pandemonium caused by the use of terrorism
to fight for political liberation on the English soil (White 2013). The yearning of the French
authorities to control terrorism stems from hard-won-lesson (Shapiro and Benedite 2003). With its
long history of terrorism, dating back to the French revolution, France has always been on the
“bleeding edge” of terrorism. But in order to prevent terrorism and defend the homeland, the
French government, unlike the United States, Britain, and Germany, embarked on and developed
a different repertoire of actions to fight terrorism (Shapiro and Benedite 2003). This article
examines the schemes adopted by these societies that have suffered terrorism longer than Nigeria.
It is hoped that the strategic analysis that will be offered can be applied and be used for the security
interest of Nigeria. However, it is important to try to ascertain the genesis of the problem that
caused the sudden interests of some Nigerians to behave in un-Nigerian ways. There must be some
explanations for the rising trend of violence in the form of kidnapping and terrorism in Nigeria.
Methods and the Framing of Terrorism
Criminological theories, properly framed, can provide the context for explaining terrorism
in Nigeria. We begin with this contextual approach because understanding the causes of crime
may provide the social and intellectual bedrock to recognize the bane of terrorism. Robert Agnew’s
(2010) General Strain Theory (GST) of terrorism provides an apt elucidation of terrorism, which
can be applied to the situation in Nigeria. Agnew (2010) insists that the GST is appropriate for
understanding the causes of terrorism, because in GST, “strain” the main premise of the theory, or
“grievances” that perpetrators of terrorism feel, are the main basis of terrorism. Agnew, however,
stated that the definitional problems of terrorism are likely to affect the way that the strain theory
is used to explain the causes of terrorism. He argues that it is important to isolate the particular
type of strain that actually causes terrorism. In addition, he reiterates that only a small portion of
those affected by strain actually resort to terrorism. While other strain theories fail to isolate the
particular type of strain that leads to terrorism, GST does (Agnew 2010).
According to Agnew (2010), current strain theories of terrorism attribute terrorist acts to
various grievances associated with relative material deprivation, religious and socio-cultural issues
relating to modernization and globalization; resentment over cultural, economic and military
domination by the United States and other Western cultures; territorial ethnic and religious
disputes resulting from postcolonial efforts at nation building; economic, political and racial/ethnic
discrimination; denial of basic human rights as well as political rights and personal security rights;
harsh state repression, hence widespread violence towards certain groups; severe challenges to
group identity (Post 2007); displacement or loss of land or home; military occupation of certain
types. Basically, terrorist groups identify with one or more of the aforementioned grievances and
sometimes ascribe their group names to these. When applying Agnew’s GST to the issue of
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terrorism in Nigeria, it is apparent that previous and current acts of terrorism have been perpetuated
by “collective groups” as described by Agnew. Strains that are most likely to contribute to
terrorism are those felt by members of an identified, collective group, that is, groups bound by
race/ethnicity, religion, political affiliations or territory (Agnew, 2012). Agnew (2012) maintains
that the strain individual members of these terrorist groups feel lead them to terrorism as a way of
coping with the strain they experience. Additionally, the strain that individuals feel reduces the
effects of social control and ties on the prevention of terrorism because the causes of the strain
often evokes feelings of sympathy, tolerance and support. In essence, individuals commonly have
loose ties with the source of their strain (Agnew, 2012).
Agnew rightly states that GST is not an absolute explanation of terrorism; he lays emphasis
that there are other social contributing factors to the developments of strain. He suggests that a
more complete explanation would have to include a range of theories and the complex
relationships between them to explain the psychological contributing factors that lead to terrorism.
GST, therefore, isolates only one of the causes of terrorism, that is, the type of terrorism caused
by collective strain.
In retrospect, counter-terrorism measures can be applied to terrorism caused by collective
strain by changing policies that will have long term effects on communities that harbor the
individuals that react to the strain they feel. In line with this, Agnew argues that collective strain
that leads to terrorism has serious policy implications, such as attempting to reduce the causes of
collective strain by targeting “intervening mechanisms that link collective strains to terrorism”
(Agnew 2012, 148).
One other measure is by providing intervening legal channels of addressing grievances.
Other counter-terrorism measures can be applied after examining what has been done before in
other countries in countering terrorism caused by strain. Therefore, just as America needed new
laws to deal with the occurrences of September 11, 2001, so also, Nigeria needs to revisit the public
policy arena that will provide solutions for the current spate of terrorist attacks occurring in the
country, especially those that have been identified as being caused by collective strain, such as that
being carried out by Boko Haram.
Tracy (2012) states that the events of September 11 placed the decision to respond to
terrorism in order to keep the homeland safe inadvertently in the hands of the government and
public policy arena and became the area by which the government responded. Generally, a policy
that will attempt to respond to the issues of terrorism in Nigeria will have to affect environmental
and structural issues like the preparedness of local police response as it relates to the structure of
policing the community (Tracy 2012). This is just one of the ways to counter-terrorism.
In fact, theoretical frameworks with which to explain the security systems in many subSaharan African States are almost non-existent in the securitization policy literature. What can be
inferred are evidence of historical colonial para-military systems for subduing and controlling
resistance within the pre-independence indigent communities. Though in many of the more
promising states like Nigeria and Ghana, these systems have received elaborate burnishing to
reflect contemporary Western ideals of State security. Mabe (2009) notes quite correctly that
security is a political principle that affects all aspects of human existence. He states that “security
represents a principle underlying all national actions, which pursues the goal of promoting
economic and political development.” While it may be difficult to identify the universal appeal for
security due to the reality of a vast difference in the unique needs of the world’s multicultural
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spatial settings, in historical African anthologies, as can be identified within some of its
contemporary societies, securitization policies are often founded on the basis of group bonding,
material wealth, as well as on spiritual fortification. Mabe further identified that in Africa the
existence and belief in the concept of transcendental forces with immense power to secure
individual and group existence and their material accumulations also possess elements of rational
realities.
General securitization principles of traditional African societies established the
requirement for old age security, personal and physical security, communal/home security, soil
security, and food security. Oral traditional African concept of security differentiates between the
need for security based on fear, isolation, mourning and other emotive occurrences or expectations
and security based on a reasoned consciousness for the preservation of human life (Mabe 2009).
These dual expressions of security reflect the theories of securitization based on superstition, and
the other that is based on rational thought. It is evident that traditional African forms of security
elaborated the comprehensive needs of the individual members of the society to bind them to a
form of a communal securitization agenda. These same security principles can be found in the
provision of welfare packages that act as buffers for the socioeconomic welfare of citizens in
contemporary Western democratic societies. However, most security principles advanced in the
practice of sub-Saharan African governance is wholly based on physical life and material security.
Mabe (2009) states that most forms of security arrangements in African states emanate from
political and religious persecution, social inequality, racial and sexual discrimination, hunger and
poverty, and hatred, envy and war.
Thus, it is possible that some of the major security problems apparent in African societies
today, such as, terrorism can be traced to ill-informed approaches of governments in the region
towards fulfilling the desires of their citizens (Mabe 2009). This line of argument agrees with
Ekanem and Simon (2012) assertions that conflicts in African states are generally a result of the
struggle for power, values, and scarce resources.
For Mabe (2009), security in modern African States is rooted on the governance of
intimidation by the few without winning the reasoned support of the citizens. This, indeed, was
the case with the governance of apartheid South Africa, where the minority population ruled
without the consent of the governed (see Onwudiwe 2001). Furthermore, as Mabe insists, in spite
of measures adopted for an establishment of a democratic culture, sub-Saharan African States often
rule by caveats without popular and agreed plebiscites. Thus, leaving a gap of unpopular
acceptance that could easily be leveraged by the lawless to foment trouble for the entire society. It
must be underscored that Robert Agnew’s explanation of crime due to elements of societal strain
can be established from these ill-developed principles of security upon which modern African
States secure and guide their nations. In some form, it can be seen as a part abdication of the social
contract between the State and its citizens. Thus, strain, emanates out of the crucible of the
yearning to reach the goals of this contract for the innovative few among the citizenry and acts as
a platform to retrieve the right to create and live within their own individual/group rules. Finally,
Mabe (2009) submits that a theoretical framework for security in Africa must begin with the
realization that security has a direct relationship to “dignity, liberty, and well-being.” The influence
of totalitarian ideologies in postcolonial Africa seems to limit the realization of this ideal. Mabe
aligns this with the decreasing level of ethical considerations in the governance of African states.
Tedheke and Tedheke (2012) study of the problem with the engagement of Nigerian forces
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in global peace support operations (PSO) reveals that inadequate attention is given to develop and
understand the theoretical foundations of those problems before formal engagement. For instance,
Nigeria has tended to associate such peace support problems with ethnic, cultural, and sectional
differences more than the major causal functions of structural hemorrhages due to the demands of
Western global economy.
In the determination of a theoretical foundation for Nigerian security against issues of
violent resistance and social upheavals, it is important to identify the enabling routes of violence
in a society. According to Tedheke and Tedheke (2012), Johan Gatlung, a foundational authority
of the concept of structural violence listed three primary types of violence that would enable the
manifestation of social upheavals: “(i) direct violence -physical, emotional and psychological
violence; (ii) structural violence -deliberate policies and structures that cause human sufferings,
death and harm, and (iii) cultural violence -cultural norms and practices that create discriminations,
injustices and human sufferings.”
Each of these three forms of violence is undeniably related to the contemporary situation
of sectarian and terrorist violence in Nigeria. But the type most misunderstood by Nigerian security
policy-makers and long denied by governments in Nigeria is structural violence. The theoretical
foundation of such security policies is not unrelated to the remnants of imperial trade policies and
the system of postcolonial Western trade hegemony, which creates sub-conscious resistance to its
structural destabilizing effects on the poorer nations of the global South. Tedheke and Tedheke
relate the rise of poverty and social upheavals in the southern region of the world to the need to
adapt to Western economic philosophies and structure that has been imposed on the rest of the
world. This includes the economic disparities created by trade between the powerful and wealthier
nations of the world, and the poorer nations, on the one hand, and the economic disparities between
the elites and the masses within the poorer nations. Although colonialism had played its role in the
leadership cerebral attitudes of African leaders, we caution quietly that imperialism can no longer
be blamed for the 21st Century African problems anymore.
The need to adapt to the socioeconomic and political strains of these disparities has often
resulted in violent resistance even with negative innovations such as terrorism, and kidnaping as
currently evident in Nigeria. This pattern of PSO understanding of security is a manifestation of
one major angle from which Nigerian authorities approach issues of internal security. Nigeria’s
sub-imperial roles in the PSO as argued by Tedheke and Tedheke is equally operative within her
national security governance structure. In this sense, the continuous misinterpretation of the
fundamental situations of Nigeria security is a major problem for the development of a functional
and enduring securitization policy for the nation. Arguably, structural economy is only a part of
the misunderstood dynamics of violent upheavals in Nigeria as it is difficult to deny the influence
of sectional religious indoctrination that leads to the proclivity for terrorist attacks in the Nigerian
historical context.
Genesis of Terrorism in Nigeria
We argue that Nigerian policy-makers must understand the sources of terrorism without
being a-historical. Historical facts about terrorism are important if there is any hope of countering
modern brutal nature of terrorism. Some terrorism observers have noted the importance of
comprehending the history of a terrorist group, individual terrorists and the conditions that
spawned them (Simonsen and Spindlove 2004). If violence leads to terrorism, then history is
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replete with many cases of terrorism all over the globe. Terrorism seen in this context has become
part of recorded history (Simonsen and Spindlove 2004; Parry 1976). Indeed, knowing the history
of the evolution and contemporary forms of terrorism is a vital tool in an all-inclusive investigation
of acts of terrorism. Without a focus on in-depth historical studies of terrorism, the Nigerian
government can only provide a military solution to the barbaric acts of terrorism in the country.
The history of religion and religious radicals in all the regions as well as the political and
economic protest groups of the country must be studied. Moreover, Nigeria has a rich history of
northern patterns of religious violence. The recent surge of the Boko Haram terror is in sync with
the historical evolution of violence with a determined base on the principles of sacramental acts
(Hutchinson 2001; Hickey 1984; Onwudiwe 2011). Therefore, within balance and reason, an
understanding of the history of terrorism, not only would aid policy-makers to know the genesis
of the issue, but also would oblige the Nigerian thinkers to formulate counter approaches to the
problem of terrorism and the defense of the Nigerian homeland. Certainly, knowing the historical
roots of terrorism will benefit societies and their intellectual thinkers to be aware of the
chronological episodes and practices and tactics of terrorists all over the world in order to have an
unadulterated exposure to the laboratory of terrorists’ behavior and explanations of that behavior
(Gagnon 1989).
Indeed, historically, Africa has witnessed violence in the form of religion (political
Islam/Christianity), leading to butchery or the annihilation of numerous living or lifeless objects,
all in the context of religion (Longman 2001; Gettleman 2006). The methods of violence are rooted
in various clichés, most notably crusades in Nigerian history, civil wars in Sudan and Darfur, and
genocide in Rwanda. Another modus operandi may take the form of terrorism, martyrdoms, and
sacrifices. While there are other religions that may cause human havoc in the world today, such as
Buddhism and Hinduism in Sri Lanka, Africa generally is confronted by two major religions,
Christianity and Islam. Sudan, however, presents a different scenario, in which there is a
confrontation between Islam, sometimes Christianity, and African traditional religions.
Christianity and Islam are religions rooted in sacred writings and can be used to serve and justify
religious killings and oppressions. In various parts of the world today, religion is in one way or
another associated with warfare, and Africa is not alone in this regard. Indeed, most religious
zealots believe that their actions are approved by their gods, and are willing to kill and die for their
political causes (Dickson 2012). The attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, which claimed
about 3,000 lives, was religiously motivated, and two countries in East Africa have experienced
similar catastrophic havoc based on political Islam. David Dickson, in his 2005 special report for
the United States Institute of Peace points to the impartiality of Islamism and argues that it involves
a desire for the recruitment of followers in order to achieve certain ideological objectives such as
the defeat of imperialism. However, one author cautions against the demonization of Arabs and
Muslims in the war against terrorism (Onwudiwe 2005).
With the rise of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, one wonders if this terror group is not
actively recruiting despondent youths as ardent supporters and active cohorts with a strong focus
on indoctrination. The Boko Haram must have been supported directly and indirectly by some
elitist groups to have such an impact on Nigeria after the democratic election of President
Goodluck Jonathan. One must then try to identify the causes of the motivations of this religious
adherent sect with the ability to carry out horrific acts of terrorism against the Nigerian population.
Does the Boko Haram borrow their political acts from the Nigerian historical past? Although it is
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easy to blame radical religion, it may also be a truism that the same system to system factors
(unemployment, economic marginalization, lack of equal opportunity, injustice, inadequate
education, political corruption, pollution, inadequate electric power and good roads etc.) motivate
groups like Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
This is evident from the following charts where the acts of terrorism by numbers of incidents seem
to escalate as the years’ progress. In Charts I, II, and III adapted from the Global Terrorism
Database, we have identified various agitational groups that have perpetrated acts of terrorism
against Nigeria, breaking the charts into the following timelines 1991- 2000 (10 years); 2001-2010
(10 years); and 2011-2013 (3 years). Charts IV–VI depict fatalities by these perpetrators using the
same timeline. The last six charts show the number of incidents by type of attacks and weapons of
attacks using the same timelines for each group. The Global Terrorism Database (GTB) has
collected data on world terrorism and has statistics from 1970. It is important to note, however,
that there was only one recorded incident between 1970 and 1980, and 5 incidences between 1981
and 1990 for Nigeria; therefore those statistics are not included in this paper.
Chart I: Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of incidents 10 years: 1991-2000
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Chart II: Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of Incidents 10 years: 2001-2010
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Chart III: Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of Incidents 3 years: 2011-2013
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Chart IV: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities 10 years: 1991-2000
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Chart V: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities, 10 years: 2001-2010
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Chart VI: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities, 3 years: 2011-2013
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Chart VII: Number of Incidents by Type of Attacks 10 years: 1991-2000
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Chart VIII: Number of Incidents by Type of Attack: 10 years: 2001-2010
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Chart IX: Number of Incidents by Type of Attacks, 3 years: 2011-2013
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Chart X: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 10 years: 1991-2000
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Chart XI: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 10 years: 2001-2010
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Chart X1I: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 3 years: 2011-2013
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The data illustrate that the three years 2011 to 2013 showed the highest numbers in terms
of almost all the statistics. For example, the number of terrorist incidents recorded for Boko Haram
was 0, 27 and 776 for the three timelines 1991-2000, 2001-2010 and 2011-2013, respectively;
while the number of fatalities by the same group recorded higher numbers: 0, 376 and 3267,
respectively for the same timeline. These numbers clearly show an escalation in the activities and
fatalities by Boko Haram over the past thirteen years.
Having made that clarity, religious turbulence in Nigeria is usually between Muslims and
Christians, sometimes between moderate Muslims and radical Muslims with roots in Sufism and
the Wahhabi ideologies of Saudi Arabia (Schwartz 2003). The 1980 and 1982–1983 Maitatsine
uprisings in northern Nigeria occurred between a wing of Muslim militants and the Nigerian police
and posed a major threat to Nigerian security. This instability has its origins in traditional Islam, a
northern state religion that began in the fifteenth century. During that era, most Hausa rulers in the
North of Nigeria were converted Muslims. Between 1804 and 1808, Nigeria experienced the jihad
of Usman Dan Fodio of Sokoto Caliphate. Usman Dan Fodio was a devout Fulani philosopher, a
venerated Islamic scholar, and an avant-garde reformer. During his era, he was very popular and
had a large following, and his jihad, unlike the religious uprising of Maitatsine, was aimed at the
purification of Islam, not the killing of unbelievers. As a religious and political leader, he created
a new Muslim state in northern Nigeria, known as the Fulani Empire, which was grounded in
Islamic law. The Fulani Empire stretched across most of northern Nigeria and wielded great
political power and influence in Nigeria and over the colonial administrators (Hickey 1984).
After Nigerian independence in 1960, the powerful northern Muslim elites still controlled
101
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political, military, and economic power in the country. In 1966, Sir Ahmadu Bello, former premier
of the region and the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was a devoted Muslim leader with genealogical
affiliation to Usman Dan Fodio, was assassinated in a military coup. That assassination and the
subsequent military rule in the nation set in motion the events that resulted in the 1980 and 1982
religious riots. The powers of the Muslim elites were reduced, and a devout Christian General
Yakubu Gowon became the military leader following the crisis of 1966. Moreover, the new
constitution provided for the freedom of religion. This did not augur well with some Muslim
prophets in the North who wanted to establish a firm Islamic state in the country. Alhaji
Muhammadu Maroua, popularly known as Maitatsine (“He who curses others” in Hausa),
stimulated his Isala faction to perpetrate acts of violence in Kano. This ultimately led to his death
and also claimed the lives of 5,000 of his supporters in 1980 (Hickey 1984). It took the combined
efforts of the Nigerian army and the air force to quell the violence. Subsequently, in 1982, in
Maiduguri, Nigeria, the police and the disciples of Maitatsine once again engaged in a ferocious
battle when police tried to arrest the disciples and the remaining leaders of the Maitatsine
movement.
This bloody encounter led to the death of hundreds of the Maitatsine supporters. The
Maitatsine movement still poses a serious threat in Nigeria and must not be ignored, because
adherents of the uprising not only resist political changes in the country, but also are eager to use
violence against moderate Muslims. In short, they dislike Western education, technological
advancements in Nigeria, and the contamination of Islam in a worldly Nigeria. These two accounts,
of the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio and the religious violence of Maitatsine and his cohorts,
demonstrate that Nigeria is still a volatile society, as also evidenced by recent acts of religious
violence in Africa’s most populated nation. In our view, the Boko Haram ideology must be traced
to this brief history. We will argue below that using the military may not be the democratic means
to prevent these religious violent formations. Both Sharia and Christian values can function
simultaneously in Nigeria without sporadic killings of human beings. The separation of Church
and State has worked well in Western societies and Nigeria must be wise enough to address the
Sharia matter once and for all (Hickey 1984).
The Sharia Issue
Today, Sharia (Islamic law) has been introduced in more than eleven states of the thirtysix states of Nigeria. Additionally, Sharia also has been made part of the Nigerian constitution,
which now permits a Sharia Court of Appeals in the Nigerian polity. The spread of Sharia in
Nigeria may be a product of Nigerian Muslims’ desire to reassert their political power in response
to neo-southern Christian political ascendancy. On the other hand, the Christians and mixed
religious states view Sharia as an alien religion and cultural imposition. Although Sharia exists in
twelve states, its strongest adherents will not rest until it has engulfed the whole of Nigeria and
beyond. The angry resistance to the spread of Sharia in Nigeria is a major cause of tension and
violence in the country (Mahmood 1993).
In February and May of 2000, communal religious violence claimed the lives of 2,000
Nigerians in Kaduna City. In 2002, a newspaper article considered to be offensive to the Prophet
Muhammad led to another round of violence in Kaduna, which claimed the lives of 200 people.
Christian opposition to Sharia practices in the North will continue to elevate tensions in Nigeria.
Sharia may be an excuse, however, and not the root problem in an oil-rich nation with severe
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economic disasters and massive unemployment among the youth. Nigeria will continue to
experience violence, whether from Islamic militants or from Christian fanatics, as long as there is
growing economic marginalization of the masses and continued presence of massive poverty.
Violence on the scale of terrorism may also escalate in Nigeria as a result of the infusion
of radical religious ideologies in the minds of depressed citizens. This reality ought to worry not
only Nigeria, but also the international community. Christianity and Islam can work hand in hand,
without constant threats and violence, although the Nigerian population is equally divided between
the two religions. Such is not the case in Senegal, a country of 11 million people in West Africa.
Indeed, 94 percent of the Senegalese population are Muslims, and the country has in place
a proper equilibrium between Islam, a material state, and modernization. As is true for their African
counterparts, the conviviality between politicians and Muslim leaders has its origins in colonial
administration. If Senegal can maintain peace and tranquility among its people, Nigeria, should
set a better example. Nigerians deserve to live in peace without constant fear of violence regardless
of where it originates. However, since the problem is now endemic, it behooves the Nigerian
intellectuals to provide proven social scientific solutions to unravel the turbulence of terrorism in
Nigeria. Below, we suggest various forms of the repertoire of actions for counter-terrorism and
counter kidnapping measures to control violence and killings in Nigeria.
Counter-terrorism Measures, Justice and Security in Nigeria
It is crucial to note that terrorism, unfortunately, as we know it today, has reached Nigerian
shores and we must, therefore, find strategic security measures to prevent it. This means that
Nigeria is as vulnerable to terrorism as other countries in the West and the Middle East. In order
to control terrorism, it is vital to first ascertain what is known about terrorists. What are their
motives and objectives? Why has Nigeria suddenly become a domestic terrorist paradise? Are
émigré terrorists penetrating the Nigerian porous borders, and if that is the case, what can the
authorities do about it? Based on the extant literature, it is obvious that Boko Haram terrorists are
motivated by religion. Although Herman (1983) in the Terror Networks insisted that state terrorism
is the most dangerous form of terrorism, it is surmised in this article that religious motivated
terrorists in Nigeria pose the greatest danger to the Nigerian polity and population. This is because,
as observed by Hoffman (1993), religious terrorists perform their terrorist operations for the grace
of the deity and they believe that their actions are sacramental acts with forthcoming reward from
divine providence.
If Boko Haram and other groups in the South have demonstrated the ability to actually
embark on the adoption of violence against the government and the population to force behavioral
modification (Dyson 2012), law enforcement at all levels of government must have the immediate
duty to investigate such law violations. Terrorists are criminals, their actions are rooted in an
ideology of violence and destruction, and violent suicide and political and economic actions are
designed to instill fear and frighten Nigerians. It has been reported in various Nigerian Newspapers
and Magazines that Nigerian terrorists have used bombing tactics, kidnapping of other human
beings, physical threats and assassinations in Nigeria. These actions and tactics are all violations
of the Nigerian law.
Government has the responsibility to protect its citizens. The Nigerian government through
its intelligence and law enforcement sectors must know that some terrorists have outside financial
funding and also supported by internal wealthy financiers. Some engage in illegal activities, such
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as kidnapping for ransom, white collar crimes, robbery of banks and armored vehicles and
extortions to raise funds. Others, it has been demonstrated, also engage in the business of illegal
importation of firearms and collusion with other illicit crime groups in order to generate funds.
Funding is crucial for the survival of a terrorist organization. These brief tactics have been properly
documented in the literature on terrorism (White 2009; Dyson 2012; Poland 1988) therefore, law
enforcement officials must be familiar with them to begin to address ways to combat terrorism in
Nigeria.
Nigeria, like the rest of the sub-Saharan Africa, experiences turbulent violent revolutions
primarily due to tattered economic development. Any reasonable countermeasures to prevent
terrorism must consider seriously the stabilization of the economy. Generally, Africa suffers from
violent revolutions and insurgencies because of the extreme poverty of the masses. Scholars
believe that negative economic development; struggle for scarce resources, inadequate health-care
facilities, starvation of the children, tribal violence, and massive unemployment of the youth may
create conditions ripe for terrorism (Barnett 2004; Sachs et al. 2004; White 2009). To put it in
another context, Bell (1975) used the aphorism “endemic terrorism” in his explanation of terrorism
in Africa. He describes terrorism in Africa as involving artificial divisions of tribes, and ethnic
groups. With the situation in Nigeria today -Boko Haram menace in the North and the groups in
the South agitating for a greater share of the nation’s resources, it is evident that Bell’s observation
may have some roots in ethnic pursuit for reasonable distribution of resources and power.
Just recently, the Odua People’s Congress, Odua People’s Congress (OPC)(another major
ethnically motivated group in the country), admonished members of the terror Islamic sect, Boko
Haram, to stay away from the South-West. Dr. Frederick Fasehun, its leader, advised the federal
government to stop the senseless violence in the country. He insisted that the Yoruba people
(ethnic group) cannot be suppressed as if the Yoruba is an inferior ethnic group in the nation even
though the Yoruba, he insisted, fought gallantly for the Nigerian independence (Sun Times 2011).
The president of the OPC is right on the mark on the issue. It may take regional ethnic groups to
come out with strategic security plans to stop these sects and others from harassing and killing
Nigerians.
Moreover, the US State Department’s Annual Country Assessments of Global Terrorism
stated in April 2006 that:
‘Though it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups’ were present and operating in west and central
Africa, the fund raising, terrorist recruiting, and other support activities of al-Qaeda and affiliated
persons and groups in Algeria, the Maghreb, Nigeria, and across the trans-Sahara region remained
a serious concern (U.S. Department of State 2012).
The report lists terrorist incidents of either apprehension or collaboration in 16 African
countries, including arrests of terrorist suspects and disruption of alleged terrorist operations in
Kenya to recruitment activities by known al-Qaeda affiliates in Nigeria, as well as the abuse of
travel documentation by foreigners in South Africa on US and UK terrorist alert lists. Basically,
the information provided by the U.S. Department indicates that terrorism is not just a western
problem. In essence, Nigeria with its large Muslim population and Christian citizens must play a
major role in maintaining security within and beyond its boundaries.
Developing a capacity for counter-terrorism in Nigeria and Africa as a whole requires
cooperation among states externally and communities internally for the country to develop the
capacity to protect its citizens from the havoc of terrorism. Factual and practical cooperation is
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essential in the war against terrorism within and among agencies of social control in Nigeria.
Indeed, the U.S. departments report noted and recognized the African Union (AU) as one of the
“essential elements” in a common front against transnational terrorism (Shillinger 2006). Nigeria
as a major voice should not be taken by surprise after the events of September 11, 2001 in the
United States, and subsequent incidents in East African nations of Kenya and Tanzania. The
Nigerian government must encourage counter-terrorism cooperation among all levels of
governments and security agencies and the incorporation of all ethnic groups in dialogues about
preventing terrorism.
In our repertoire of actions, we will argue cogently that the people can provide the native
intelligence needed to stop Boko Haram. These repertoires of actions, the core of this essay are
framed below. The goal is to demonstrate that contrary to the view that nothing can be done
effectively to control the spate of violence that has characterized Nigeria today, various proven
criminological actions exist to address the terrorism quandary.
Counter-Terrorism Measure I: Law Enforcement, Detection, and Investigation
Counter terrorism can be defined as the sum of actions and practices adopted by states and
various nations against perceived threats and terrorist activities (Crank and Gregor 2005). In the
case of Nigeria, these actions may be carried out by émigré and domestic terrorist agitators. The
Nigerian police must be the primary control mechanism in the detection and discovery of terrorist
activities. The force must be equipped with the latest technology and manpower needed to detect
and investigate terrorists. This could be done by methodological aggressive involvement of the
citizens. Unlike previous beliefs that terrorists are not well-informed, recent accounts remind us
that they are intelligent and some are equipped with college education (Onwudiwe 2007).
Detection and observation of terrorists are important in that detection serves as the link between
observation and investigation. Every terrorist network operates in three phases: RESEARCH,
PLANNING, AND EXECUTION. Terrorist research can be thwarted by detection, planning by
discovery and execution by observation, detection and discovery (O’Connor 2009).
The Nigerian police must be adequately trained in the detection response plan, which may
include vigilance by local government to local government arrangements, house to house basis,
and state by state basis. But this could only be done properly and effectively if the police are closer
to the people that they police. This is why one of the author’s called for the decentralization of the
Nigerian police (Onwudiwe, 2001), and local police formations (Onwudiwe 2009). The police and
the people must work together, and this is important for any peacekeeping operations. Once the
people are friendly with their police, they are more amenable to provide the police with the
information needed to apprehend terrorists before they strike.
Recently, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the U.S. Department of
Defense organized a small number of scholars from Europe and American academy to consult and
suggest ways to improve African security (Perry and Borchard 2010). It was suggested that proper
use of community policing frame will aid in maintaining African security. The same principles
articulated by the team of scholars will work well in Nigeria as presented below.
The team of scholars observed that certain principle-level lessons learned about community
policing from other contexts (i.e. what approaches worked and what did not) can be applied to the
Nigerian contexts. Some principles that are the foundation of other’s community policing (CP)
approaches (China, Belgium, United Kingdom, USA) which might strengthen Nigerian CP include
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the implementation of a police training component to improve and maintain professionalism and
helping them be co-producers of justice with the community in order to prevent crime, terrorism,
and kidnapping. As many of these problems manifest in Africa, and Nigeria, in particular, there
may be a potential to consider what other non-African countries have done to address these issues
through CP approaches and tailor them to the Nigerian situation (Wisler an Onwudiwe 2009).
Fundamentally, CP is based on the recognition that citizens are co-producers of crime prevention
and that good police-citizens are required to do this. The information they provide to the police is
the foundation of solving crimes, arresting offenders, preventing disorder, and, in some cases,
countering terrorism and kidnapping. Given the primacy of good relations and effective
information exchange in ensuring successful CP, the CP approach minimizes the use of force by
the military.
Four problems identified in counter-terrorism operations that rely on the use of the military in
the West are:
1. Western democracies carry an aversion to military forces used to deal with domestic
problems. The use of the military in a police role in the U.S. is a violation of federal law.
2. The use of the military power to deal with terrorism has frequently been associated with
the rise of repressive regimes, particularly across the Americas. Often, the repressive
regimes linger long after the terrorist threat has subsided.
3. Military units may employ specialized tactical units who engage in anticipatory and
retaliatory strikes. Yet, many argue that such strikes lead to a cycle of violence, in which
terror is meted out by both sides in never-ending conflict.
4. The debate over the proper use of the military in civilian affairs is often rancorous. The
debate particularly focuses on the use of unconventional military tactics aimed at terrorist
groups, and the ‘fair play’ implications of those tactics (White 2009).
In Africa, however, many states still rely on their militaries to provide their internal
security. In addition to African militaries being political tools of the state and protectors of the
regime and its political interests (a situation that is true with Nigeria), militaries more generally
provide internal security within the state as they are, more often than not, the only available tool
for this purpose. Given this situation, one needs to understand the central role and relatively high
status of African militaries when examining the ways in which and the degree to which such
militaries might consider their force options to maintain internal security within their respective
territories as well as possible implications on African governments’ decisions to disband and/or
eliminate their militaries and develop less-lethal security forces to serve this purpose.
African militaries are the only means by which most African governments can maintain
internal state security. In the African context, the question of whether the military is the most
effective tool with which to maintain internal security is not asked because it is the only tool
available. Even though training is lacking in Africa in comparison to the West, African militaries
are usually the only security forces in Africa that receive any training and therefore are the most
capable entities in providing security through lethal and/or non/less-than-lethal means. But
regardless of the use of the military to stop terrorist and insurgent groups in Nigeria, sporadic
killings of Nigerians continue unabated. While White did not reject totally the use of the military
in troubled situations, he suggested that governments should be cautionary and use the army only
discretely (White 2002).
Austin Turk (2002) on the other hand, is supportive of the use of the military force in
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counter-terrorism. Turk suggests that there are three options in counter-terrorism such as the
application of individual justice against terror networks, treating terror networks as if they were a
nation and apply globally recognized rule of law, and believing that the enemy is a special danger
that requires extraordinary military measures. Turk favors the last option for the treatment of
terrorists. This reality calls for reforms. The following recommendations will help to address the
insecurities in Nigeria without reliance on the military:
a. Develop criminological and security institutes, a form of think-tank across the nations’
colleges and universities based on competitive funding announcements. These institutes
will conduct research and propose strategies to ameliorate the problems of insecurities in
the country.
b. Encourage and fund Nigerian scholars to develop terrorism research institutes that will
focus on counter domestic, émigré, and international terrorism, piracy, human trafficking,
and kidnappings in the country.
c. Expand security agencies to admit and recruit fresh students and youths into their ranks.
Expansion of the military population, police, and other security agencies and personnel
will create more gainful job opportunities for our people.
d. Decentralize the Nigerian Police and encourage local police formations that still are
answerable to the center.
e. Create rules that will mandate the Nigerian police to develop and establish community
policing units that will be closer to the people and for intelligence purposes without
undermining the cultures of the land.
f. Pass laws that will make it illegal to expropriate Nigerian resources abroad and focus on
hiring Nigerian consultants rather than relying on Euro, Asian, and American Experts.
g. Fund and mandate Nigerian universities to establish criminological and criminal justice
academic programs as was done in other developed nations such as the United States in the
1960s.
It is our fervent belief that the Nigerian police, if properly funded and trained, will, indeed,
work hand in hand with the people to slow the tidal wave of terrorism. Nigerians are good people
and suicide terrorist bombings may not the part of the hallmark of the Nigerian character. In a
situation where the police officer is underpaid or the department has limited resources to operate,
things will continue to be bad and the citizens will continue to suffer the scourge of terrorism.
Nigerians do not deserve to be unsafe. It is the social contract responsibility of the government to
keep the people safe. The government cannot afford to fail in this remarkable responsibility due
to lack of the development of localized intelligence organizations.

Counter-Terrorism Measure II: Intelligence and Law Enforcement
In this sphere of our second remedy, we must underscore that good intelligence is the most
important repertoire of action in the fight against terrorism. Good intelligence comes from good
policing that recognizes the integration of the philosophy and principles of community policing
frame. Good intelligence is the best weapon against terrorism (O’Connor 2009). This means that
understanding the tenets of community policing is crucial in the war against terrorism since CP
focuses on pro-action rather re-action in police work. This analysis means that for law enforcement
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and the citizens alike, it is better to prevent terrorism than to investigate it. For law enforcement
agencies that are well funded, intelligence is the initial level in the fight against domestic terrorism.
The integration of the human factor is crucial in the protection of Nigerians and the Nigerian
visitors such as the foreign business personnel and quests of the Nigerian nation. In this way,
counter-terrorism intelligence by the Nigerian police must entail more than covert intelligence
gathering and prevention. This necessitates that it must be broadened to encompass activities such
as covert and overt detection, interruption of plots, intelligence risk analysis, target hardening,
community enlistment, protection of persons and infrastructure, emergency assistance to the
people, order-maintenance during and after an attack, easing of damage, and professional
investigation of incidents (O’Connor 2009; White 2002).
For Nigeria to be effective in preventing internal insurgencies in its desire to wipe out low
intensity warfare, she must be willing to expend with resources directed to hiring freshly minted
graduates from Nigerian universities, recruitment of top quality professionals in Nigeria including
Nigerians in the Diaspora for the gathering and maintenance of intelligence data. The enforcement
agencies need resources to hire top trained intelligence analysts that will maintain both covert and
overt collection of data. The development of police strategy in Nigeria must center on police
intelligence skills that will enable the force to effectively anticipate or deal with the devastating
events of domestic terrorism. Police efforts must include the ability to develop knowledge about
probable future events and rapidly respond to surprises. In the contemporary technological age,
societies are dealing with increasingly more complex environments. If an organization is to
effectively use intelligence to prepare for the discontinuities of terrorism, it must take a long look
at the role of the intelligence function (Underwood 2002). With an increasing world of Sufism and
terror networks with capacities to spread terror messages, the police cannot afford to conduct
business as usual.
Frank Gregory (2005) states that intelligence in counter-terrorism programs must include
three fundamental factors: (1) its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity; (2) its role
in post-incident investigations; and (3) its contribution to preventive/protective security measures.
In his examination of the British counter-terrorism strategies, Gregory observes that the UK should
focus on (Gregory 2005):
(1) Prevention – addressing underlying causes of terrorism here and overseas. That means, among
other things, ensuring that Muslim citizens enjoy the full protection of the law and are able to
participate to the full in British society.
(2) Pursuit – using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists. The UK has
increased joint working and intelligence-sharing between governments and law enforcement
agencies across the world. At home, the government aims to make UK borders more secure,
to make identity theft harder and to curb terrorist access to financial sources.
(3) Protection – ensuring that reasonable security precautions, including those needed to meet a
CBRN threat, are in place, ranging from physical measures at airports to establishing CounterTerrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) in each police force.
(4) Preparedness – making sure that the UK has the people and resources in place to respond
effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack.
Nigeria can equally use these parameters of security identified by Gregory (2005) above for
preventing terrorism in the UK (Gregory 2005). Particularly, it is crucial for Nigeria to deny
terrorists the funding necessary to fuel their terrorist missions.
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Counter-Terrorism Measure III: Information Sharing and Financial Intelligence
Hapsburg General Raimondo Montecuccoli once asserted in the seventeenth century that a
country needed three items to wage war: money, money, and more money (White 2009). This
adage is applicable to terrorism as terrorists cannot survive today and be successful with terror
campaigns without adequate financial resources. Organized political suicide missions cannot be
sustained without money. Modernity has changed the face of terrorism in that terrorists can now
conduct their operations faster than they have done in the past due to technological innovations
(Black 2004). The manner in which technology aids modernity is the same way it affects the
network operations of terrorists. In short, money transfers by terrorists and the movement of funds
and effective communication systems have transfigured the financial world.
This analysis applies to the domestic terrorists in Nigeria. The government must therefore
close any loopholes that exist to make it difficult for Nigerian terror networks to get funding. This
can be done by first monitoring domestic activities of the suspected financiers of Nigerian
terrorists. The banks must be integrated in this effort. In this case, information sharing becomes
absolutely necessary. The Nigerian intelligence and all arms of the national security apparatus
must be mandated to share information. This has been done in America after the horrors of
September 11, 2001. The government reorganized the American National Security under the
umbrella of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The CIA, FBI, the state police, and
indeed, all the arms of the security and intelligence are required to share information. Since then,
although one author stated that America is still vulnerable to terrorism (Flynn 2004), the fact
remains that the American homeland is better defended today than prior September 2001 (White
2009).
But it will be naivety to expect and assume that Nigerian terrorists are only sponsored by
Nigerian financiers. Efforts also must be made to monitor and investigate the activities of foreign
governments, groups, businesses, religious institutions, and charitable organizations. To protect
Nigeria from organized sponsors of insecurities, the government must work boldly and integrate
individuals that will advise the State to fight the battle and to win it. This is a vital and cardinal
responsibility of the State. Given the reality that Nigerians are now willing to kill other Nigerians
and foreigners (bombing of the UN office in Abuja, for example) the government has no choice
but to place the defense of the Nigerian Homeland in the hands of a massive national security
establishment that will integrate citizen trust in order to keep a round- the- clock vigilance of the
country. There is an obvious clear and present danger facing our country and all hands of the law
and citizenship must be on deck to fight terror.
We conclude this frame of counter financial measure against terrorism by mentioning
briefly some criminological examples in the literature. The federal government must be vigilant
about the creation of new banks in the country. Adams (1986) insists that the most effective
method to stop terrorism was to stop the flow of money. Adams focused on banking and organized
crime to illustrate his view. He pointed out that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) ran
its own banking system. He also indicated that the IRA made a “Capone discovery,” in which it
established organized crime syndicates to finance operations. Other scholars pointed to the
establishment of grocery stores to fund operations (Kushner and Jacobson 1998); transfer of illegal
contrabands (Hinnen 2004), and illegal business laundering millions of dollars (Navis 2002).
Noting these research reports, it is important to know that tracing the movement of funds is an
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essential component of counter-terrorism measure. The Nigerian federation must reject the
approval and bogus establishment of new banks and must be willing to watch the emergence of
new businesses and organized crime networks through efficient and effective forensic accounting
techniques and use of legal prosecution.
Counter-Terrorism Measure IV: Prosecution of Terrorists and Civil Law Actions
Our final approach to the control of terrorism in Nigeria is through the legal prosecution of
Nigerian terrorists and their sponsors. We argue that a determined Nigeria shall prosecute out of
existence the terrorists and their financial patrons. It is noteworthy that civil action by private
citizens has been effective against domestic terrorism (Smith 1994; O’Connor 2009). In Terrorism
in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams, Smith (1994) demonstrated how the U.S. attorneys
successfully prosecuted leaders of domestic terrorists with the maximum imprisonment permitted
by law (Smith 1994). In addition, because the networks and their leaders were civilly held
responsible, they were prosecuted to oblivion financially. Imagine a situation where Nigerian
citizens affected by the spate of terrorism were allowed to prosecute these terrorists and their
sponsors. Monetary awards to the victims of terrorism will lead to the bankruptcy of the networks
and their investors. As we aforementioned, without money, they cannot operate. Therefore,
criminal and civil prosecution of terrorists in Nigeria will be an effective countermeasure with the
desire to prevent terrorism and save Nigerian lives. Nigeria must be willing to seize the assets and
all wealth belonging to the terrorists and their benefactors. Foreign sponsor’s assets and money
must also be seized. Their lucrative business holdings must be sold and the proceeds should be
distributed to compensate the Nigerian victims and their families. Nigeria must fight fire with fire.
On the international front, Nigeria should consider a possible severance of diplomatic
relations with foreign nations that support terrorism on its soil. Smith reported that President
Reagan retaliated against Libya when there was a “smoking gun” that Libya authorized a strike
against American servicemen in West Germany on April 5, 1986 that claimed two American lives.
Because of this, the U.S. launched a retaliatory strike against Libyan targets in Tripoli and
Benghazi. We mention this one incident just to illustrate the extent to which a country can act
when the lives of its citizens are threatened and destroyed by the covert activities of other sovereign
nations. Nigerians must take the same bold steps otherwise the Nigeria we know will never be
safe again and certainly will become a safe haven for terrorist radical sects’ and émigré terrorists,
that is, foreign born terrorist’s resident in Nigeria.
Discussion
As Flynn (2004) rightfully noted that America is still vulnerable to terrorism, Nigeria with
its own infinite might is also vulnerable to determined terrorist acts against the Nigerian people
(Flynn 2004). What remains in the face of this obvious reality is what is to be done by the
government and the people to stem the tidal wave of the scourge of terrorism. We have articulated
in this brief treatise the repertoire of actions necessary to combat terrorism and senseless violence
and kidnapping in Nigeria. We opine that in order to prevent terrorism, Nigeria must take bold
actions without hesitation using the instruments of the government, particularly, the intelligence
machinery of the government to control terrorism. It is our view that to successfully control
domestic and émigré terrorism in Nigeria that the police must be at the forefront of the fight. The
Nigerian police units must be well funded to integrate the communities within their various
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jurisdictions to detect and capture Nigerian terrorists. Intelligence gathering through citizen
cooperation has been found to work well in countries such as Japan that have scrupulously
integrated its citizens in their police work.
In a situation where citizens are made part of security participants, intelligence will follow
naturally for the police and the police will build trust with the polity. The use of the military is not
the answer to counter-terrorism alone without active participants of the communities and police
work. Assuredly, we also propose that the government should fund and encourage the
development of security and criminologically focused research institutes at various Nigerian
universities. These institutes will have a mandate to be co-producers of justice like the members
of the ordinary citizens. In addition, the Nigerian federal government must encourage the
development of criminal justice preprograms, police institutes, and fund the Nigerian police for
the development of more police training programs. Most important, the Nigerian government must
open the military and other security agencies such as the police to recruit and employ more
graduates from Nigerian universities and abroad. Unless the youths can regain their consciousness
through gainful employment, they will continue to be vulnerable to brainwashing by radical
terrorist adherents. Employment opportunities are a major key to the fight against domestic
terrorism whether it stems from the North or from the South.
While one can find skirmishes of these ideas in this piece, we articulated clearly four
repertoires of actions that we believe if adhered to will help Nigeria control the menace of
terrorism. Given more than 20 years of experience in writing and studying terrorism, it is our view
that we have provided ideas that are popular and that have been proven to work. Community
policing, decentralization of the Nigerian police and authentic local security formations, whether
formal or informal (Onwudiwe 2007; Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009) will, indeed, bring the police
closer to the citizens than they are today. It will help bring terrorists to justice and once again will
make Nigeria safe for its populations.
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